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I.

INTRODUCTION

In early 2020, the COVID-19 virus spread quickly across the
nation and inevitably into hundreds of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detention centers and prisons
across the country. Children and families who were already held
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in substandard prisons conditions before the virus1 were
suddenly presented with the impending COVID-19 pandemic.
While ICE detainees fell victim to the virus,2 so did prison staff,3
because CDC guidelines aimed at curbing the spread were
impossible to implement. ICE officials threatened to place
detainees in quarantine cells with COVID-19 positive inmates if
they did not comply with deportation orders.4 Over 700 ICE
domestic flights carried sick detainees from one ICE detention
center to another, while other ICE flights transported ill
detainees to various countries.5 Children were kept in detention
centers despite release orders.6 ICE detainees were thrown in
solitary confinement for requesting COVID-19 tests.7 As a
result, numerous lawsuits challenged the conditions in ICE
detention facilities and demanded the early release of children
and families, including those with preexisting conditions who

1. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ET AL., CODE RED: THE FATAL
CONSEQUENCES OF DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN IMMIGRATION
DETENTION (2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/06/20/code-red/fatalconsequences-dangerously-substandard-medical-care-immigration.
2. See Farida Jhabvala Romero, Half of All Detainees at Bakersfield ICE
Facility Have Tested Positive for COVID-19, KQED (Aug. 18, 2020),
https://www.kqed.org/news/11833925/half-of-all-detainees-at-bakersfield-icefacility-have-tested-positive-for-covid-19.
3. See Esmy Jimenez, 3 Staff Test Positive for Covid-19 at Tacoma’s
Immigrant Detention Center, KUOW (Oct. 26, 2020, 2:13 PM),
https://www.kuow.org/stories/second-guard-tests-positive-for-covid-at-tacomas-immigrant-detention-center.
4. See John Washington, ICE Threatened to Expose Asylum-Seekers to
COVID-19 If They Did Not Accept Deportation, THE INTERCEPT (Feb. 6, 2021,
12:21
PM),
https://theintercept.com/2021/02/06/ice-covid-threat-asylumdeportation/; see also Ray Levy Uyeda, ICE Is Threatening to Expose
Immigrants to COVID-19, Detainees Say, MIC (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://www.mic.com/p/ice-is-threatening-to-expose-immigrants-to-covid-19detainees-say-61252008.
5. See Emily Kassie & Barbara Marcolini, How ICE Exported the
Coronavirus, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (July 10, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/07/10/how-ice-exported-thecoronavirus.
6. See Jasmine Aguilera, 120 Children Remain in ICE Detention Despite
Court Order for Them to Be Released Due to COVID-19 Concerns, TIME (Aug.
17, 2020, 11:58 AM), https://time.com/5878909/children-ice-covid-19detention-court-order/.
7. See Clarissa Donnelly-DeRoven, Immigrants Detained by ICE Say They
Were Punished for Requesting COVID-19 Tests, THE INTERCEPT (Dec. 3, 2020,
1:00 PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/12/03/etowah-ice-detention-covidoutbreak/.
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are more vulnerable to the virus.8 The results of these cases
varied. In California, fifteen detainees with medical conditions
filed a class action Fifth Amendment and civil rights suit against
ICE alleging inadequate medical, mental health, and disability
accommodations.9 The federal judge ruled in favor of the
detainees and ordered ICE to consider releasing immigrants
with medical conditions who were high-risk and noted that,
“[t]he evidence suggests systemwide inaction that goes beyond a
mere ‘difference of medical opinion or negligence.’”10
This Note will examine how the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment is implicated in
the treatment of immigrant detainees and conditions at ICE
facilities during the COVID-19 crisis. Parts I and II will consist
of a brief overview of ICE facilities and recent COVID-19 cases.
Part III will examine the relevant constitutional provisions
which apply to medical care in prisons, namely the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the
Eighth Amendment. The barrier that detainees face, i.e., that
they cannot file an Eighth Amendment claim to lessen time, will
be identified in Part IV. In Part V, this Note will argue that a
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for early release could and
should be made by immigrant detainees, because officials were
deliberately indifferent to their medical needs through
treatment and conditions which have shocked the human
conscience.11 Part V will also describe the additional difficulty
for both Eighth Amendment and Due Process claimants to prove
the heightened “deliberate indifference” requirement. This Note
will conclude by recommending that the courts speak up on what
immigrant detainees should do to resolve the looming circuit
split and the reluctance of the Supreme Court to establish a rule
on this issue.

8. See Suzanne Monyak, Top Immigration Cases of 2020: Year in Review,
LAW360
(Dec.
21,
2020,
6:08
PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1333361?e_id=2dedb027-654e-42b2-a487f2b4759f7590&utm_source=engagementalerts&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=case_updates.
9. See Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709, 718
(C.D. Cal. 2020); see also Monyak, supra note 8.
10. Fraihat, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 745 (quoting Bell v. Mahoney, 2019 WL
6792793 (C.D. Cal. 2019)).
11. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
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OVERVIEW

ICE was created in 2003 and is a division of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).12 Identification and
arrest, domestic transportation, bond management, supervised
release, detention, and alternatives to detention are all dealt
with by the “Enforcement and Removal Operations” (“ERO”)
directorate of ICE.13 There are over 200 ICE detention centers
across the country, which are operated by private prison
corporations and local jails that contract with ICE to detain
immigrants.14 These detention centers house non-U.S. citizens
if they are determined to require “custodial supervision”15 while
they await removal proceedings.16 These detainees include nonU.S. citizens who currently face removal because of criminal
allegations or because they are undocumented.17 ICE detainees
also include non-U.S. citizens who arrive at the border or
airports and request asylum.18
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO
ICE DETAINEES

A. The Eighth Amendment
Prisoners can file medical care claims under the Eighth
Amendment, which states that “cruel and unusual
punishments” shall not be inflicted19 and protects “all people”
from such punishment.20 “In order to state a cognizable claim, a
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to

12. See
U.S.
IMMIGRATION
AND
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/history (last visited Dec. 3, 2021).
13. See
U.S.
IMMIGRATION
AND
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
https://www.ice.gov/about-ice (last visited Dec. 3, 2021).
14. See ACLU ET AL., JUSTICE-FREE ZONES: U.S. IMMIGRATION DETENTION
UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 4 (2020).
15. U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DETENTION
MANAGEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/detention-management (last visited Dec. 3,
2021).
16. See ACLU ET AL., supra note 14.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
20. Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 839 (6th Cir. 2020).
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evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”21 The
Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble emphasized that it is only
this heightened level of indifference that violates the Eighth
Amendment.22 Thus, if a prisoner brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
rights action claiming “an inadvertent failure to provide
adequate medical care” or that a physician has been negligent in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition, those claims would
not be considered “an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”
or valid under the Eighth Amendment.23
It has been established that the “deliberate indifference”
framework of the Eighth Amendment consists of a subjective
and objective prong.24 Under the objective prong, a prisoner
must prove “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm.”25 Under the subjective prong,
there must be proof that an official knew of and disregarded “an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”26 The Supreme Court
in Farmer v. Brennan adopted a “subjective recklessness”
standard to satisfy the subjective prong and “as the test for
‘deliberate indifference’ under the Eighth Amendment.”27 Under
this standard, “the official must both be aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”28
However, officials who knew of the substantial risk to inmate
health or safety could escape liability “if they responded
reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not
averted.”29 Thus, it can be said that the objective prong analyzes
the conditions of the confinement to determine if there is a
substantial risk,30 whereas the subjective standard analyzes the
official’s state of mind when they are accused of inflicting cruel
and unusual punishment.31
Even if harm has not occurred yet, a prisoner can still file a
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
See id.
Id. at 104–05.
See Wilson, 961 F.3d at 839.
Id. at 840 (citations omitted).
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Id. at 840.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 844.
See generally id.
See id. at 838–39.
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successful Eighth Amendment claim regarding the conditions of
their confinement.32 The Helling court held that “[i]t would be
odd to deny an injunction to inmates who plainly proved an
unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison on the ground
that nothing yet had happened to them.”33
B. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
The Fifth Amendment provides that, “[n]o person shall be .
. . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law” by the federal government.34 Likewise, the Fourteenth
Amendment provides for those same due process rights through
the states.35
Immigrant detainees have protection under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments for the
conditions of their confinement.36 In theory, immigration
detainees should be provided with a higher level of medical care,
given that they are civil detainees and have not been convicted
of a crime.37 The Ninth Circuit noted that, “due process requires
that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.”38
IV.

BARRIERS TO RELIEF UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

32. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (explaining that the
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals have recognized a remedy for unsafe
conditions where a tragic event has not yet occurred, i.e., one need not wait for
a tragic event to occur to file a claim for future harm under the Eighth
Amendment claim).
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. See, e.g., Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d
709, 741 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (ICE detainees brought three claims under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for failure to monitor various practices
during the COVID-19 pandemic); see also Malam v. Adducci, 452 F. Supp. 3d
643, 658 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (finding that immigrant detainee was likely to
succeed on Fifth Amendment claim surrounding COVID-19 conditions).
37. See Carl Kenneth Lipscombe, Tylenol and an Ice Pack: An Inadequate
Prescription for HIV/AIDS in Immigration Detention Centers, 11 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 529 (2013).
38. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)).
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A. Civil Pretrial Detainees versus Criminal Detainees
Although U.S. citizens can file suits under the Eighth
Amendment in order to lessen their time at prisons, courts have
held that immigrant detainees cannot do so.39 The right to file a
writ of habeas corpus40 is granted by the Constitution,41 and
habeas corpus is mainly used “to seek the release of persons held
in actual, physical custody in prison or jail.”42 “Habeas corpus
proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to
challenge the ‘legality or duration’ of confinement.”43
Meanwhile, a civil rights action can be filed under various
different statutes,44 and “is the proper method of challenging
‘conditions of . . . confinement.’”45 Both habeas corpus and civil
rights actions can be filed under the Eighth Amendment.
However, the roadblock that immigrant detainees face
revolves around the fact that they are civil detainees46 rather
than criminal detainees, and therefore cannot file a habeas
corpus claim to lessen their time under the Eighth
Amendment.47 Rather, immigrant detainees can only file a civil
rights claim under the Eighth Amendment relating to the
conditions of their confinement, usually after they are

39. See generally Calderon-Rodriguez v. Wilcox, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1024
(W.D. Wash. 2019).
40. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2008).
41. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 cl. 2.
42. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238–40 (1963) (noting that
habeas corpus is not limited to situations where the applicant is in custody,
but can be used by aliens, members of the military and other situations where
one’s liberty is restrained).
43. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991); see Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973) (“the essence of habeas corpus is an attack
by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”).
44. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1996).
45. Cox, 931 F.2d at 574.
46. See Homer D. Venters et. al., HIV Screening and Care for Immigration
Detainees, 11 HEALTH AND HUM. RTS. J. 89 (2009) (noting that immigrant
detainees are “non-criminal” immigrants who are detained because of a visa
violation or other immigration issue, but not charged with any crime and do
not enter the criminal justice system).
47. See Calderon-Rodriguez v. Wilcox, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (W.D. Wash.
2019) (denying inmate’s Eighth Amendment habeas corpus claim because
detainee was challenging length and not the conditions of his confinement); see
also Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 470 (8th Cir. 2014).
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released.48 Following a successful civil rights claim under the
Eighth Amendment, the usual remedy would be to cease the
conditions of confinement that the prisoner challenged, or
monetary damages if the prisoner challenged past treatment.49
B. The Circuit Split on Habeas Corpus Claims
Courts have noted that “the Supreme Court has not
explicitly foreclosed” or even limited the use of habeas corpus to
“conditions of confinement” claims.50 Remarking on this, the
Fifth Circuit in Poree v. Collins noted that the line between
habeas corpus claims and civil rights claims—such as § 1983
claims—“is a blurry one.”51 Some circuits have limited habeas
corpus claims to those that challenge the fact or duration of
confinement,52 while others have not.53 The Supreme Court has
left for “another day the question of the propriety of using a writ
of habeas corpus to obtain review of the conditions of
confinement, as distinct from the fact or length of the
confinement itself.”54 This has resulted in a circuit split on the
issue, with the Eighth55 and Ninth56 Circuits holding that
habeas corpus claims should be limited to fact or duration of
confinement, while the Fourth57 and Fifth58 Circuits refuse to
48. See Cox, 931 F.2d at 574.
49. See Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive
Punishment, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1583–84 (2012) (arguing that early
release should be a remedy under the Eighth Amendment).
50. Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, 455 F. Supp. 3d 330, 336 (S.D. Tex. 2020);
see also Poree v. Collins, 866 F.3d 235, 242–43 (5th Cir. 2017); see generally
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
51. 866 F.3d at 243 (quoting Cook v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice
Transitional Planning Dep’t, 37 F.d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994)
52. See generally Wilcox, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1024.
53. See Poree, 866 F.3d at 243 (Fifth Circuit court not limiting “fact or
duration” claims to habeas corpus actions).
54. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979).
55. See generally Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467 (8th Cir. 2014).
56. See generally Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1991).
57. See generally Vazquez Barrera v. Wolf, 455 F. Supp. 3d 330 (S.D. Tex.
2020).
58. See generally Poree, 866 F.3d 235. Cf. Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d
818, 820–21 (5th Cir. 1997) (acknowledging the “blurry” line where a prisoner
challenges an unconstitutional condition of confinement that affects the timing
of his release from custody, and adopting a "simple, bright-line rule" to
determine when § 1983 or habeas corpus action was the proper vehicle for a
claim).
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limit habeas corpus claims such requirements.
Immigrant detainees are similar to “pre-trial detainees,”59
because both categories of detainees are confined without any
convictions, and the Eighth Amendment does not apply to
pretrial detainees.60 For this reason, cases involving pretrial
detainees will be used throughout this Note. “Although
convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees are often housed in
the same facilities, incarceration and detention are based on
vastly different purposes and justifications.”61 The Supreme
Court has held that “Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate
only after the State has complied with the constitutional
guarantees
traditionally
associated
with
criminal
62
prosecutions[.]”
Further, “[t]he State does not acquire the
power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned
until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in
accordance with due process of law.”63 The Supreme Court has
also stated that pretrial detainees “may not be punished prior to
an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law.”64
Therefore, because pretrial detainees have not been convicted,
in theory, “[d]etention does not, in and of itself amount to
punishment,” and courts have held that the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment does
not apply to pretrial detainees.65
In City of Revere v.
59. Lipscombe, supra note 37, at 540 (noting that pretrial detainees are
essentially persons who have been charged with a crime(s) and are placed in
correctional facilities while they await trial and should not be “subjected to
punitive conditions of detention” meant for convicted prisoners).
60. See E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306–307 (3d Cir. 2019) (as a matter
of first impression, Second Circuit court holding that immigration detainees
are entitled to the same due process rights as pretrial detainees—in line with
the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits).
61. DeAnna Pratt Swearingen, Innocent Until Arrested?: Deliberate
Indifference Toward Detainees’ Due-Process Rights, 62 ARK L. REV. 101, 102-03
(2009) (noting that while the purposes of incarceration include punishment,
pretrial detention does not include punishment, but rather state interests such
as ensuring that the offender appears at trial and guaranteeing the safety of
the community during the trial itself). See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 748 (1987) (noting that “the Government’s regulatory interest in
community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s
liberty interest.”).
62. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (quoting
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671–672 n.40 (1977)).
63. Id. (alteration in original).
64. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
65. Swearingen, supra note 61, at 111 (emphasis added).
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Massachusetts General Hospital, the Supreme Court held that
“[b]ecause there had been no formal adjudication of guilt”
against the pretrial detainee who was alleging inadequate
medical care, the Eighth Amendment did not apply there.66
Rather, the Court used the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and held that a pretrial detainee’s due
process rights “are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment
protections available to a convicted prisoner.”67
C. The Use of the “Deliberate Indifference” Requirement for
Eighth Amendment and Due Process Claims
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments for pretrial detainees draw from the Eighth
Amendment, which applies to convicted prisoners. In fact,
courts have applied the Eighth Amendment “deliberate
indifference” test—discussed infra—to claims by immigrant
detainees.68 “The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment protects prisoners from the ‘unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.’”69 On the other hand, “[p]retrial
detainee claims, though they sound in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth
Amendment, are analyzed under the same rubric as Eighth
Amendment claims brought by prisoners.”70
In Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, the Ninth Circuit specifically
highlighted that the Supreme Court has not established a
bright-line rule restricting the use of habeas corpus in
“conditions of confinement” claims.71 The Gordon court noted
that, “[w]hile [the Supreme Court] did ‘not necessarily answer
the broader question of whether the objective standard applies
to all § 1983 claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment
against individual defendants[,]’ logic dictates extending the
objective deliberative indifference standard . . . to medical care

66. 463 U.S. at 244.
67. Id.
68. See Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018);
Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013).
69. Villegas, 709 F.3d at 568 (quoting Barker v. Goodrich 649 F.3d 428,
434 (6th Cir. 2011)).
70. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
71. See Gordon, 888 F.3d 1118.
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claims [by pretrial detainees].”72 The Gordon court reasoned
that a deliberate indifference standard should be used, given
that § 1983 itself contains no state of mind requirement and
claims brought by pretrial detainees are brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause rather than the
Eighth Amendment.73 Citing the Wilson Supreme Court case,
the Gordon court compared medical care claims to inadequate
“conditions of confinement” cases.74 The Gordon court held that
a deliberate indifference test—which is one of the elements of an
Eighth Amendment civil rights claim—applied to the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim by pretrial
detainees.75 Therefore, in essence, the court determined that the
Eighth Amendment does not apply to medical care claims
brought by pretrial detainees, while it used an exact Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference test to hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied.76 Other courts have noted this
nuance, which serves as a slight explanation for why the
Supreme Court has not blatantly restricted the use of habeas
corpus claims in “conditions of confinement” cases.77 This also
serves as an explanation for why the Eighth Amendment should
be used in habeas corpus claims—because the courts end up
using an Eighth Amendment test, directly dealing with
conditions of confinement, for claims of inadequate medical care
by pretrial detainees.
The mere use of the Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference test in Due Process cases evinces even more of a
need for immigrant detainees to be able to file Eighth
Amendment claims under a habeas corpus action to lessen time
because of the conditions of their confinement. However,
embedded in the reason why the Eighth Amendment does not
72. Id. at 1124 (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015)
(emphasis added)).
73. See id. at 1124–25.
74. See id. at 1124 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 301 (1991)).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir.
2016) (creating “more than negligence but less than subjective intent” test
which the court notes is different from the Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference test). This nuance seems to lead courts like Castro to create their
own variations of the Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” test while
trying to justify how those tests differ from the Eighth Amendment’s
“deliberate indifference" test.

11
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apply to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is that the
purpose of pretrial detention is not punishment—incarceration
is. Likewise, the purpose of ICE detention is not punishment,
because ICE detainees are in centers awaiting asylum or
removal proceedings. However, the reality of the conditions in
ICE facilities and the treatment of ICE detainees may not
coincide with their purpose. The reality—discussed infra—is
that pretrial detainees and ICE detainees are being punished
unlawfully, and are thus being treated like incarcerated
individuals, which begs the need for pretrial detainees to bring
claims under the Eighth Amendment. The mere fact that this is
happening and that even the question of the use of the Eighth
Amendment arises is unjust and contrary to what the
constitutional drafters envisioned.
V.

THE CONSTITUTION AND MEDICAL CARE:
COVID-19 CLAIMS

A. The Difficulty of Proving “Deliberate Indifference”
Eighth Amendment “inadequate medical care” claims have
been struck down by courts, mainly because of the difficulty to
prove the subjective prong, i.e., that officials acted with
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs. Courts
have recognized claims of deliberate indifference to various
medical needs and issues: exposure to tobacco smoke;78
vulnerability to suicide due to mental health conditions;79
vulnerability due to insulin-dependent diabetes;80 sexual
reassignment surgery for transgender inmates;81 inter alia. On
the other hand, courts have failed to uphold medical care claims
for the various medical needs listed above and for medical needs
such as abortion and HIV/AIDS treatment. One such instance
was the court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s claim in Bryant v.
Maffucci, which expounded that because health care at the
correctional facility was geared towards “gender neutral medical
needs, the medical customs and policies exhibited a systemic
78.
79.
80.
2003).
81.

See Helling v. Mckinney, 509 U.S. 25, 34–35 (1993).
See Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 224 (3d Cir. 2017).
See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575 (3d Cir.
See De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013).
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deficiency with regard to the health care requirement unique to
women, and that its treatment of abortion can only be
characterized as deliberate indifference.”82
In strong
disagreement with this claim, and moreover, with the appellate
court subsequently affirming, the district court laid out the
various steps that the correctional facility took which were not
deliberately indifferent.83 These steps included the procedure
for pregnant inmates at the prison, where it was routine for
them to be provided with sonograms, to make a formal request
for an abortion, an examination to determine when the abortion
is to be performed, as well as actual performance of the abortion
at a medical center located in the county.84
Similarly, claims of inadequate medical care for the
treatment of HIV/AIDS have been struck down by courts
because the subjective prong required under the Eighth
Amendment was not satisfied. For example, in Bigoski-Odom v.
Firman, the court held that the defendant doctor was not
deliberately indifferent to an inmate for a temporary five-month
discontinuation of her HIV/AIDS medications.85 Similar to
Bryant, the court looked at the evidence and pointed out all the
defendant’s actions, which lacked a disregard for the plaintiff’s
serious medical need due to HIV/AIDS. Specifically, the court
noted that the defendant “examined and treated [the] plaintiff .
. . obtained advice from specialists, and . . . followed that
advice.”86 Further, the court indicated that the evidence showed
the plaintiff’s medication was discontinued because the plaintiff
had pancreatitis, and the doctor provided the plaintiff with
additional medications “designed to prevent opportunistic
infections” during that time.87 Further, the plaintiff was sent to
outside specialists, and placed on a liquid diet, among other
treatments, for her complaints of abdominal pain.88
The difficulty in proving the subjective prong allows
government officials who are defendants in Eighth Amendment
82. 729 F. Supp. 319, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 923 F.2d 979 (2d Cir.
1991).
83. See id. at 326–27.
84. See id.
85. See No. 2:12-CV-0197-KJM-CMK-P, 2017 WL 5998226 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
4, 2017).
86. Id. at *5.
87. Id.
88. See id.
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and Due Process cases to indicate the actions that they have
taken, much like what the courts have done to strike down
Eighth Amendment claims. However, courts have identified the
impossibility of being able to prevent prisoners from contracting
COVID-19 in overcrowded and communal facilities. As the
Brann court posited in a Due Process case filed by pretrial
detainees at Rikers Island due to the COVID-19 crisis,
“‘[r]easonable care’ and ‘mitigation’ obligations are not satisfied
by tossing a bucket of water on a four-alarm house fire, or by
placing a band-Aid [sic] on a compound bone fracture.”89 Rather,
“[r]easonable care to mitigate must include an effort to employ
an effective ameliorative measure.”90 The court specifically
noted that “[p]risoners with dangerous conditions are
dramatically at risk. For some of them, only release can offer
protection.”91 More importantly, the Bryant court identified that
officials and correctional facilities need “not provide the most
efficient system for inmates” to have access to medical care.92
This supports the notion among the courts, which is that federal
and state officials are only constitutionally required to provide
“minimally adequate care” to incarcerated individuals.93
Government officials can therefore counter immigrant
detainees’ claims with this line of argument whenever prison
conditions are challenged and can ultimately be successful.
The common reason for courts striking down inadequate
medical care claims is because of the heightened standard put
on plaintiffs to prove the subjective prong—that officials had a
state of mind in which they knew of a risk of serious harm to an
inmate’s health and disregarded it.94 Moreover, the courts have
varied in how they have ruled on immigrant detainees’ claims of
inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment and the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
However, the common denominator lies in the difficulty of
satisfying the subjective prong, i.e., the state of mind component,

89. People ex rel. Stoughton v. Brann, 122 N.Y.S.3d 866, 872 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2020).
90. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. Bryant v. Maffucci, 729 F. Supp. 319, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 923
F.2d 979 (2d Cir. 1991).
93. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504 (11th Cir. 1991).
94. See generally Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
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of an Eighth Amendment claim.
B. Recent COVID-19-related Suits by Immigrant Detainees
Many of the recent circuit court decisions have been
unpublished, most likely due to the recent nature of COVID-19
claims by immigrant detainees. In one of these unpublished
opinions, Hernandez Roman v. Wolf, the Ninth Circuit held that
the lower court had the jurisdiction to hear ICE detainees’ class
action, which sought declaratory, injunctive, and habeas corpus
relief amid the COVID-19 pandemic.95 Although the Hernandez
court remanded these issues back to the lower court, it relied on
the case law which has upheld that “[t]he Fifth Amendment
requires the government to provide conditions of reasonable
health and safety to people in its custody.”96 The court
admittedly agreed with the district court that the Government
failed to meet their Fifth Amendment duty, because at the time
of the lower court’s issuance of an injunction, the facility was so
crowded that social distancing was impossible, detainees had
inadequate access to masks, hand sanitizer and soap, guards
were not required to wear masks, “detainees were responsible
for cleaning the facility with only dirty towels and dirty water,”
and detainees had to sleep with less than six feet between
them.97 The court went on to hold that “[t]he Government was
aware of the risks these conditions posed, especially in light of
high-profile outbreaks at other facilities,” and still failed to
remedy the conditions.98
In a recent 2020 case, immigrant detainees filed a habeas
corpus petition seeking immediate release claiming that due to
their age and health, their continued detention during the
COVID-19 pandemic put them at fatal risk.99 Hope v. Warden
95. See 829 F. App'x 165, 167–68 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining that the
plaintiffs (many of which had no criminal record) claimed that conditions at
the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in California “placed them at an
unconstitutional risk of contracting COVID-19.” Furthermore, they plead that
Adlanto’s failure to implement protective measures such as social distancing,
sanitation, and providing sufficient masks and soap violated their Fifth
Amendment due process rights.).
96. Id. at 172.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See Hope v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 972 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 2020).
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tackled the habeas corpus “barrier” that immigrant detainees
face, which this Note addresses.
Specifically, the court
acknowledged that it has “never held that a detainee cannot file
a habeas corpus petition to challenge conditions that render his
continued detention unconstitutional.”100 This indicates the
court’s openness to allow ICE detainees to be able to file habeas
corpus actions to lessen their time because of the conditions they
face in detention centers. The Hope court further looked to the
statute itself, which grants the writ of habeas corpus, and noted
that the language of the statute—28 U.S.C. § 2241—justifies the
use of a habeas corpus writ by non-prisoner detainees.101 For
instance, the court noted that § 2241(e) excludes enemy
combatant detainees from filing a writ of habeas corpus.102 The
court posited that this suggests that where the § 2241(e)
exclusion does not apply, i.e., to immigrant detainees, the habeas
corpus writ may be used.103 The Hope court then went on to hold
that the petitioners properly challenged their conditions of
confinement under a habeas corpus writ.104 While holding that
the petitioners had a cognizable habeas corpus claim to seek
early release because of COVID-19 concerns, the court was
careful to caution on the purpose of a habeas corpus petition,
which should only be used in extraordinary circumstances.105
Although the Hope court held that the petitioners had a
cognizable habeas corpus action for early release, it also held
that the petitioners failed to establish that the Government was
“deliberately indifferent” toward their medical needs under their
Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendment claims.106
In
determining this, the court analyzed “whether the Government
imposed the challenged conditions for the express purpose of
100. Id. at 324.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. This interpretation of § 2241 goes to the fact that the statute
explicitly excludes a certain category of detainees, i.e., enemy combatants, from
using a habeas corpus writ, with no mention or exclusion of immigrant
detainees from filing such writ. See id.
104. See Hope, 972 F.3d at 324–25.
105. See id. at 324 (the court classified the circumstances that existed in
March 2020 because of the COVID-19 crisis were in fact extraordinary and that
the petitioners’ habeas corpus claim was not improper because they used the
habeas corpus petition to seek only release on the basis that unconstitutional
confinement conditions required it).
106. Id. at 331.
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punishment, and if not, whether they are rationally connected
to a legitimate purpose . . . .”107 Because the petitioners argued
broadly that the Government had no legitimate interest in
detaining them, the court held that they did not show a
substantial likelihood of success on their unconstitutional
punishment claim.108 In the alternative, the petitioners argued
that the Government acted with deliberate indifference, which
effectively deprived them of their substantive due process— the
Hope court also struck down this argument based on an analysis
of the facts.109 The court was not convinced by the lower court’s
criticism of the Government for not doing enough to combat
COVID-19, which it saw as insufficient to establish deliberate
indifference.110 The court further noted that a “failure to
eliminate all risk” did not establish deliberate indifference, and
highlighted that the record showed that the “Government
increased its efforts to minimize risk by improving hygiene and
decreasing exposure even as information on the virus
changed.”111
The Hope decision is a good illustration of the juxtaposition
that district courts face when dealing with COVID-19 related
claims by immigrant detainees. The Hope court remarked on
this by stating that it “acknowledge[d] difficulties faced by trial
courts in emergent matters and the need to act immediately,
particularly during a pandemic.”112
However, “exigent
circumstances do not empower a court to jettison fundamental
principles of due process or the rules of procedure that govern
such matters.”113
C. The Eighth Amendment Applied to the Treatment of ICE
Detainees

107. Id. at 328 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979).
108. See id. at 328–29.
109. See id. at 329–31.
110. See id. at 330.
111. Id. at 330–31. Accord Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829, 840 (6th Cir.
2020) (officials who knew of the substantial risk to inmate health or safety
could escape Eighth Amendment liability “if they responded reasonably to the
risk, even if the harm was not ultimately averted.” (citing Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
112. Hope, 972 F.3d at 334.
113. Id.
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Although the case law mostly supports the rule that
immigrant detainees cannot file a habeas corpus action under
the Eighth Amendment, the conditions of confinement in ICE
detention centers and conduct of ICE and prison officials
establish a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for the
conditions of confinement (a permissible civil rights claim). Both
the objective and subjective prongs of an Eighth Amendment
claim are satisfied in how immigrant detainees have been and
still are treated during the COVID-19 crisis. Immigrant
detainees are legally able to make an Eighth Amendment claim
regarding the conditions of their confinement through civil
rights claims, but courts have struck down attempts by
immigrant detainees to make habeas corpus claims under the
Eighth Amendment.114 Thus, immigrant detainees are faced
with filing Eighth Amendment claims only after they are
released about the conditions of their detention. Efforts to
obtain the remedy of early release under the Eighth Amendment
have been struck down by various courts.115
Notwithstanding these barriers to immigrant detainees
receiving less time in detention under an Eighth Amendment
claim, both the objective and subjective elements of a successful
Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference”116 claim are
satisfied in the COVID-19 context. Under the objective prong,
the existence of a serious medical need, which is so obvious that
a layperson would realize the need for a physician’s attention,
must be shown by the plaintiff.117 COVID-19 has presented a
“serious medical need” for persons with and without underlying
medical conditions. More specifically, the Centers for Disease
Control (“CDC”) lists a number of conditions that pose an
“increased risk of severe illness from the virus that causes
COVID-19” to “persons of any age.”118 The CDC further defines
114. See Calderon-Rodriguez v. Wilcox, 374 F. Supp. 3d 1024 (W.D. Wash.
2019) (holding that Eighth Amendment doesn’t apply to alien’s habeas corpus
claim that his lengthy detention violated Eighth Amendment).
115. See generally id.; Toure v. Hott, 458 F. Supp. 3d 387, 399 (E.D. Va.
2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-6695, 2020 WL 9596387 (4th Cir. Oct. 6, 2020);
Ndudzi v. Perez, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1176, 1182 (S.D. Tex.), reconsideration
denied, 509 F. Supp. 3d 943 (S.D. Tex. 2020)
116. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
117. See Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003).
118. See People with Certain Medical Conditions, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-
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“severe illness” as hospitalization, ICU admission, intubation or
mechanical ventilation, or death.119 The CDC recommends
social distancing specifically stating that “COVID-19 spreads
mainly among people who are in close contact (within about 6
feet) for a prolonged period.”120 Further, the CDC recommends
that social distancing is to be practiced “in combination with
other everyday preventative actions,” which include wearing
masks, frequent hand-washing, avoidance of touching one’s face
with unwashed hands.121
Once the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment is
proven, the plaintiff must prove the subjective prong, which
requires a showing of officials’ deliberate indifference to an
inmate’s serious medical needs.122 The subjective prong requires
proof of an official’s state of mind which “entails something more
than mere negligence” or ordinary lack of due care for the
prisoner’s interests of safety, but less than purposeful acts or
omissions.123 The actions by officials towards immigrant
detainees concerning the lack of medical care and disparate
treatment proves that the officials were more than aware of
prisoners’ suffering and denied them humane treatment.124
What has occurred and is still occurring at ICE detention centers
across the country satisfies the subjective prong. The ACLU,
along with other human rights organizations, released a report
on the conditions of confinement in new ICE detention centers
opened after January 2017.125 This followed the organizations’
previous report on deaths in immigrant detention from 2015 to
2017, in which they found that more than half the deaths in
extra-precautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2021).
119. See id.
120. Why Practice Social Distancing, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-gettingsick/social-distancing.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2021).
121. What is Social Distancing, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-gettingsick/social-distancing.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2021).
122. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
123. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
124. See De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding
that transgender inmate had a plausible claim that prison officials knew of her
serious medical need of gender dysphoria and disregarded it in contravention
of the Eighth Amendment amidst continuing symptoms despite treatment).
125. See ACLU ET AL., supra note 14.

19

242

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 42.1

immigrant detention from December 2015 to April 2017 were
linked to the neglectful medical care of immigrants.126 Under
the subjective prong, the defendants must have known of a
substantial risk of serious harm and must also draw the
inference from facts that such risk exists.127 Along with
knowledge, they must have disregarded that risk.128
Circumstantial evidence showing that a risk was obvious,
specifically, that the risk was obvious to a reasonable man, can
allow a factfinder to conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk.129 Although the ACLU report does not detail
the conditions of detention centers during the COVID-19 crisis,
their findings “document the state of a system that was never
prepared to safely handle the crisis situation the world now
faces.”130 The facts which the ACLU found “concerning” in light
of the COVID-19 outbreak included understaffing and costcutting in medical units which were “dangerously unprepared
for emergencies;” immigrant’s lack of access to proper hygiene;
unsanitary conditions in living units which consisted of beds,
dining facilities, and restroom facilities for up to 100 people all
in one room; and virtually impossible odds for asylum seekers to
receive the release.131
With regard to understaffing and cost-cutting, medical staff
at a Louisiana detention center told researchers that a request
to see an outside doctor for a broken bone could be seen within a
week.132 Other persons at other detention centers reported that
they did not receive the necessary medication and waited days
to see doctors.133 At another correctional facility, in what was
described to the researchers as the clinic’s “emergency room,”
the room only had a stretcher and no basic emergency room
medical equipment.134
126. See id. at 31; see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ET AL., supra note
1 (this “neglectful care” which resulted in deaths included delays, substandard
care, botched emergency response, inappropriate use of solitary confinement,
and inadequate mental health care).
127. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 842; see also Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 752 (10th Cir. 2005).
130. ACLU ET AL., supra note 14, at 4.
131. Id. at 4.
132. See id. at 6.
133. See id. at 36.
134. ACLU ET AL., supra note 14, at 7.
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The report further found that immigrants are held in
“sordid conditions without access to proper hygiene products or
facilities.”135 For instance, at a detention center in Louisiana,
the researchers received reports that people were not provided
with soap to bathe, or cleaning supplies for their cells or
bathrooms.136 In a different detention center in Louisiana,
people reported black mold on the walls and leaks that would
soak beds.137 Meanwhile, in Arizona, people reported water
leaking into cells, gray drinking water, clogged toilets that were
a foot from the beds, and poor ventilation.138 Across the
detention centers, people did not receive meals that
accommodated their health needs, such as diabetes.139
Officers have threatened, used physical force, tear-gassed,
pepper-sprayed, and locked immigrants in solitary confinement
for minor infractions.140 In a Louisiana detention center, it was
reported that there were guards that would hit immigrant
detainees and refuse to feed them.141 In Arizona, it was reported
that, “a Salvadoran was grabbed by the head and slammed
against the wall for taking papers out of his belongings” on his
first day of detention, while in another incident, officers called
immigrants at the facility “rats.”142
These reports of the conditions at some of the facilities
across the country satisfy both the objective and subjective
prongs of a successful Eighth Amendment claim, in line with the
ACLU’s findings that detention centers were in a state which
were never prepared to safely handle a pandemic, such as
COVID-19.143 It is not surprising that in the COVID-19-era,
immigrant detainees are filing suits against ICE, alleging claims
which detail prison conditions that are identical to the pre135. Id. at 8.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 7–8.
141. See id. at 7 (describing that at this detention center, one man
watched “an officer yell ‘mother f—er’ at a Guatemalan immigrant and then
grab him by his neck.” Also, in a separate incident, the man witnessed an
officer “hit an immigrant so hard he thought he heard the sound of the man’s
ribs break.”).
142. Id. at 8.
143. See id. at 4.
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COVID-19 conditions that the ACLU reported on in ICE
facilities.144
VI.

CONCLUSION

Courts have struck down suits by immigrant detainees
seeking early release based on their conditions of confinement.
This has been due to the holdings by some circuits that habeas
corpus claims for early release are limited to the duration and
fact of confinement and not to “conditions” of confinement.
However, the COVID-19 pandemic has presented the U.S. with
record-number cases and deaths, which increase daily. Even
before the pandemic, ICE detainees were held in conditions
which shock the human conscience and satisfy both the objective
and subjective prongs of the Eighth Amendment. The COVID19 pandemic has worsened these conditions and rendered it
impossible to follow CDC guidelines in crowded and unhygienic
detention centers. For these reasons, early release through an
Eighth Amendment claim should be a plausible remedy for
immigrant detainees to whom officials have been deliberately
indifferent before and during this health crisis.
Some scholars have even suggested a “new standard” for
pretrial detainees because their rights are “fundamentally
different than those of a convicted prisoner,” and their rights
must be viewed through the “lens of the Due Process Clause,
[and] not the Eighth Amendment.”145 Other scholars have
recognized the barrier that the “deliberate indifference”
requirement (for both Eighth Amendment and Due Process
claims) poses to challenging pandemic conditions and have
suggested that the subjective prong should be completely
abandoned.146 With a “purely objective standard,” immigrant
detainees can be more successful in their claims as there is “little
144. See, e.g., Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d
709 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (ICE detainees alleging inadequate medical and mental
health care and disability accommodations).
145. Swearingen, supra note 61, at 116 (suggesting a two-part test similar
to the Eighth Amendment test and a burden-shift to the state to prove that the
denial of medical care was the “least-burdensome means of achieving a
legitimate state interest.”).
146. See Hannah T. Nguyen, Time to Ditch Deliberate Indifference:
COVID-19, Immigrant Challenges, and the Future of Due Process, 50 GEO L.
REV. 17 (2020).
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dispute” as to the objectively serious risk that the COVID-19
pandemic poses.147 The courts have already looked to the CDC
guidelines and have mentioned that there is “no doubt” that
prison officials are aware of the obvious and “grave threats posed
by the pandemic.”148 Even looking ahead to post-pandemic
times, the abandoning of the “deliberate indifference”
requirement would be helpful to both immigrant detainees and
judicial efficiency, as the conditions in detention facilities and
the “looming threat of COVID-19” will continue to pose a serious
risk to health and safety.149
The circuits seem to be split on whether to restrict habeas
corpus claims to time and duration and not have it apply to
conditions of confinement civil rights claims. Further, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to establish a bright-line
rule restricting habeas corpus claims to time and duration of
confinement. Moreover, the courts that do restrict immigrant
pretrial detainees from bringing Eighth Amendment claims for
the conditions of confinement use the same deliberate
indifference test (required by the Eighth Amendment) to rule in
Due Process claims. The courts’ behavior regarding the issue in
this Note necessitates the need to reevaluate how immigrant
detainees can bring their cases in light of the COVID-19
pandemic. Rather than completely adopting a strict rule or even
eliminating the deliberate indifference requirement, courts
should allow immigrant detainees to bring habeas corpus claims
to lessen their time as well as conditions of confinement civil
rights claims while they are still detained.
Given that
immigrant detainees have been facing serious risks to their
health and safety long before the COVID-19 pandemic, and now
face even more risks during the pandemic, it is imperative that
the circuits resolve their split and for the Supreme Court to
speak up, so that immigrant detainees can be afforded more
alternatives to relief.
If the courts do indeed speak up, immigrant detainees will
no longer have to wait until they are released to file conditions
of confinement civil rights claims and will be able to gain early
release through the Eighth Amendment. Even if they are not
147. Id. at 22.
148. Id. at 24 (citing Awshana v. Adduci, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1054 (E.D.
Mich. 2020)).
149. Id. at 25–26.
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released early, if given the ability to file Eighth Amendment
claims while detained, government officials will have the
opportunity to improve the substandard conditions in ICE
facilities and can be held accountable.
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